The Right to Waive Competent Counsel: Extending the Faretta Waiver by Yee, Augustine Gerard
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 4 Article 3
5-15-1991
The Right to Waive Competent Counsel:
Extending the Faretta Waiver
Augustine Gerard Yee
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons,
and the Legal Profession Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Augustine Gerard Yee The Right to Waive Competent Counsel: Extending the Faretta Waiver, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 4 (1991)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol18/iss4/3
The Right to Waive Competent Counsel:
Extending The Faretta Waiver
INTRODUCTION
The right to counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution' is the "requisite to the very existence of
a fair trial."2 Encompassing criminal prosecutions in all state and
federal courts, its purpose is to safeguard a defendant's right to be as-
sisted in the defense of his life or liberty.3 Embodied within this con-
stitutional amendment, the accused has the right to be represented
by competent and effective counsel,4 as well as the right to counsel of
choice.5 Both of these constitutional rights are well substantiated
through case law6 and may be waived when a defendant chooses to
1. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend VI.
2. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
3. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (emphasizing that the four-
teenth amendment mandates the right to counsel in state felony proceedings).
4. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970) (observing that the
right to counsel necessarily embodies the right to effective counsel).
5. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
6. Cases that support the right to effective counsel include: Perry v. Leeke, 488
U.S. 272, 280-85 (1989); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); Burger v.
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 796 (1987); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986); Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 392 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984);
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271
(1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80,
86 (1976); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970); Reece v. Georgia, 350
U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama,
308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
Cases that support the right to counsel of choice include: Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 53 (1932); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 625-26
(1989) (Court examines right to choice of counsel when criminal defendant has forfeit-
able assets and rejects defendant's right to use forfeitable assets to pay attorney fees);
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 601 (1989) (examining right to counsel of
choice as protected by sixth amendment or fifth amendment when assets are forfeita-
ble under RICO); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (Although the sixth
represent himself at trial.7 Few cases, however, have addressed the
issue that arises when a criminal defendant endeavors to waive his
right to competent counsel in order to be represented by the advocate
of his choice. This comment explores whether a criminal defendant
has the constitutional prerogative to waive his vested right to compe-
tent counsel in order to be represented by the incompetent counsel of
his choice.
The highly publicized mass murder trial of "Nightstalker" Richard
Ramirez raised this important issue.8 Despite repeated suggestions
by the trial judge that alternative counsel with death penalty experi-
ence was readily available, 9 and amidst allegations of counsel incom-
petence by the press,lO Ramirez chose to continue with his retained
counsel." Although a defendant is constitutionally entitled to com-
petent and effective counsel,12 he also enjoys the right to continue
through trial with an advocate that he believes will best serve his in-
terests.' 3 The potential conflict between these rights creates a judi-
cial dilemma: should a defendant be allowed the right to proceed
through trial with the incompetent counsel of his choosing?
Part I of this comment provides an overview of the historical back-
ground concerning the rights to competent counsel and counsel of
choice, including a discussion of the role of the judiciary in handling
waivers of the right to counsel. Part II examines the historical back-
amendment provides a right to choice of counsel, "[a] defendant may not insist upon
representation by an attorney he cannot afford").
7. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
8. Harris, Stalker Defense Begins Campaign to Spare Killer's Life, United Press
Int'l, Sept. 21, 1989. Defendant Richard Ramirez, also known as the "Nightstalker,"
was a self-proclaimed devil worshiper who was convicted of 13 murders and 30 felo-
nies. Id. After trial, speculation was raised by Ramirez's defense counsel concerning
an appeal based upon incompetency of counsel. Id.
Speculation also arose before trial as to the competence of the defense attorneys in
this high profile case. See Chen, Stalker Trial Defense Lawyer Has History of Calling
in Sick, L.A. Times, Mar. 2, 1989, part 2, at 1, col. 4; Hager & Chen, Stalker Trial Law-
yer Found 'Deficient' in '85 Murder Case, L.A. Times, Jan. 26, 1989, Part 2, at 3, col. 1.
9. Lecture by Judge Tynan at Pepperdine University School of Law, Fall 1989.
10. Cox, Nightstalker Sentenced to Death - Did Lawyers Blow It?, Nat'l Law J.,
Oct. 23, 1989, at 3, col. 1. The defense counsel for "Nightstalker" Richard Ramirez, in
addition to not calling any witnesses during the trial's penalty phase, allowed Ramirez
to appear at trial wearing a jacket which matched descriptions given to the police by
his victims. Id. Judge Tynan, the trial judge, remarked that he was permitting the de-
fense more latitude "to avoid any more issues of incompetence than are necessary." Id.
See also Gannett News Serv., Sept. 22, 1989, at 4, col. 2 ("During the trial, news reports
implied that Ramirez's lawyers, Arturo Hernandez and Daniel Hernandez, not related,
were inexperienced and seemed to be in over their heads"). Slow Road to Justice, L.A.
Times, July 21, 1988, part 2, at 6, col. 1 ("Ramirez retained two lawyers unfamiliar with
capital cases, and their inexperience shows in the indiscriminate blizzard of pretrial
motions that they filed and in their overt hostility to the prosecutor and the judge").
11. See supra note 10.
12. See supra note 6.
13. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9
(1954); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942); see also supra note 6.
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ground of waivers of effective counsel. Specifically, this section fo-
cuses on the prohibition against the arbitrary removal of counsel.
Part III discusses the ramifications of permitting the retention of in-
competent counsel and examines the requirements for a waiver of
competent counsel. Part IV addresses the roles of the judiciary and
the defendant in decisions to proceed with incompetent counsel. Part
V looks to the future of a defendant's right to continue with ineffec-
tive counsel and examines the possible impact that the Supreme
Court's decision in Wheat v. United States14 will have on a defend-
ant's choice of counsel. This comment concludes that courts should
allow a defendant to proceed with incompetent counsel if an effective
waiver has been knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made, and
has been reflected in the court record. However, there may be an ex-
ception to this ability to waive competent counsel where counsel
compromises the fair and orderly administration of justice.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Right to Competent Counsel
Under the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant is
guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel.15 This right is
fundamental in that it is designed to insure that every defendant will
receive a fair trial.16 As the United States Supreme Court stated in
the landmark case of Powell v. Alabama17:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad .... He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty,
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
14. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
15. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980) (right pertains to both appointed
and retained counsel); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (right to coun-
sel includes right to competent counsel); United States v. Otero, 848 F.2d 835, 837 (7th
Cir. 1988) ("[D]efendant is entitled to more than just a warm body standing next to
him during the criminal process").
16. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel includes counsel of
choice); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 & n.15 (1975) (trial must be fair); Mc-
Mann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) ("[I]f the right to counsel guaranteed by
the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of in-
competent counsel, and... judges should strive to maintain proper standards of per-
formance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in their
courts").
17. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
his innocence. 1 8
Due to the vital role that counsel plays in our adversarial criminal
system, court-appointed counsel is available to defendants who are fi-
nancially unable to obtain the counsel of their choice.19
The significance of representative counsel has been acknowledged
by the right to competent representation.20 In McMann v. Richard-
son,21 the United States Supreme Court explicitly held that "the
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."22
Viewed as a constitutional minimum,23 this right attaches whether
counsel has been retained or has been appointed by the court 24 and is
crucial in affording a defendant "ample opportunity to meet the case
of the prosecution."2 5 However, in a situation where a defendant
chooses to conduct his own defense, the right to receive competent
counsel is inapplicable. 26
B. The Strickland Test For Fffective Assistance of Counsel
The standard for effective representation of counsel was delineated
in Strickland v. Washington.27 Strickland involved a defendant,
Washington, who had been indicted on several counts, three of which
were for murder in the first degree. Against the advice of his ap-
pointed attorney, Washington confessed to several of the counts, in-
cluding the three murders. He claimed that family stress had
contributed to the "criminal spree."28 Washington also acted against
the advice of his attorney by waiving his right to trial by jury. The
trial judge, after receiving Washington's guilty pleas, told the defend-
18. Id. at 68-69.
19. See generally Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1972) (counsel must be
provided before a defendant may be incarcerated); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
342 (1963) (indigent defendants must receive appointed counsel in state court); John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (indigent defendant in federal court must receive
counsel).
20. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) ("the purpose [of the effec-
tive assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment] is simply to ensure that criminal
defendants receive a fair trial.").
21. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
22. Id. at 771 & n.14 (emphasis added).
23. Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 608-09 (3d Cir. 1989). See Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (the sixth amendment guarantees effective assistance of
counsel: "[T]he essential aim of the [sixth] amendment is to guarantee an effective ad-
vocate for each criminal defendant..
24. Fuller, 868 F.2d at 608-09.
25. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1942). See People
v. McKenzie, 34 Cal. 3d 616, 668 P.2d 769, 194 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1983) (reversing convic-
tion when defense counsel refused to participate in defendant's trial).
26. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
27. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
28. 1I at 672. The defendant had no prior record of criminal activity and had
claimed that "his inability to support his family" had contributed to the crime that he
committed. Id.
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ant that he had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing to
step forward and admit their responsibility," 29 but declined to com-
ment as to the effect this would have on his pronouncement. 30
The defense counsel tried to persuade Washington to utilize his
right to a jury during the sentencing phase of trial. Washington
again refused his counsel's advice and waived this right, opting in-
stead to be sentenced by the trial judge.31
Although the defense counsel's preparation for the sentencing
hearing included conversations with Washington's relatives, the de-
fense counsel neither made efforts to inquire into the defendant's
character by interviewing witnesses nor requested a psychiatric ex-
aination to determine the defendant's state of mind. Due to the de-
fendant's prior confessions, the defense counsel had few available
options and a "sense of hopelessness."32 By his actions, however, the
defense counsel was attempting to impede the prosecution's ability to
inquire into the defendant's mental state and other areas which could
be "potentially damaging."33
At the sentencing hearing, the defense attorney raised many points
in Washington's favor, emphasizing his lack of a criminal record as
well as the stress the defendant had been under.3 4 The trial judge,
however, found that the crimes were "especially heinous, atrocious
and cruel,"35 and sentenced the defendant to death for each of the
murders.36 The defendant subsequently raised a claim of ineffective
counsel, which was rejected when he sought relief in the state ap-
peals court.37
29. Id.
30. Id,
31. Id
32. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673. The defendant's counsel felt frustrated because
the defendant had already incriminated himself by admitting to the crimes and was
continuing to reject his strategic advice. Id, He believed that his chances of meeting
the case presented by the prosecution were slim. Id.
33. Id. Counsel's tactical decision of not calling witnesses or making an inquiry
into the defendant's background or mental state was utilized as a "damage control"
measure. Id. The reasoning behind this decision centered on preventing the prosecu-
tion from cross-examining the defendant, from further bolstering its case against the
defendant. Id
34. Id. at 673-74.
35. Id. at 674. All of the murders committed by the defendant had involved re-
peated stabbings. The judge reasoned that the crimes had exposed the victims to "a
grave risk of death" and were knowingly accomplished by the defendant. Id.
36. Id. at 675.
37. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675-76. The respondent made several claims concerning
his counsel's ineffectiveness, many of which included claims for poor trial performance
in raising arguments and failure to bring certain motions. The trial court found that
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, concurring with the trial
court that Washington had not made a prima facie case of ineffective
counsel.38 The defendant then sought a writ of habeas corpus in fed-
eral district court, but was denied relief.3 9 On appeal, however, the
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed and remanded to the district
court, advancing its own standard for determining the effectiveness
of counsel.40
The State of Florida sought review of the appellate court's decision,
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari4l "to con-
sider the standards by which to judge a contention that the Constitu-
tion requires that a criminal judgment be overturned because of the
actual ineffective assistance of counsel."42
The Court began by affirming that the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees the right to effective counsel.43 The Court noted that the princi-
ple behind this prerogative is the safeguarding of a defendant's right
to a fair trial.44 Claims of ineffective or incompetent representation
should therefore be scrutinized to determine "whether counsel's con-
duct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."45
The Court promulgated a two step test to determine whether "rea-
sonably effective assistance" 46 was provided by counsel4 7: (1) whether
the attorney's level of representation "fell below an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness" so as to have been ineffective;48 and (2) a re-
quirement that the defendant prove that, but for the inadequate
representation, the outcome probably would have been different.49
Both prongs of the test must be satisfied in order to prove inadequate
representation and a court may end its inquiry as soon as it becomes
apparent that the defendant will be unable to prove one or both
prongs. 50
the claims were not substantial enough to have prejudiced the defendant and noted
that the attorney's actions could be categorized as tactical decisions. Id. at 677.
38. Id. at 678. The Florida Supreme Court concurred with the trial court, agreeing
that "substantial deficiency or possible prejudice" had not been demonstrated.
39. Id. at 678-79.
40. Id. at 679. The appeals court formulated a test whereby effectiveness was de-
termined by an inquiry into whether counsel rendered reasonable assistance given
"the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 680.
41. Strickland v. Washington, 462 U.S. 1105 (1983).
42. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
43. Id, at 684-85.
44. Id. See supra notes 15 & 20 and accompanying text.
45. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
46. Id. at 687.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 687-88.
49. Id. at 687, 694.
50. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. See United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 908 (7th
Cir. 1988) (holding that the incompetence issue need not be debated if the defendant
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The Court expressed that a judge must examine how reasonable an
attorney's actions were under the facts and circumstances of the
case.51 To claim ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that the representation he received was unprofessional and un-
reasonable.5 2 A court's responsibility would be to observe whether,
under the circumstances, the counsel's actions were "outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance."53 A presumption of
competence and reasonable judgment in an adversarial situation
should be taken into account by the reviewing court.54
Courts have defined certain types of cases where prejudice to a de-
fendant is presumed.55 This is particularly evident in recent conflict
of interest cases,56 where the likelihood of prejudice in some situa-
tions is so great that a "case by case inquiry" into prejudice is ineffi-
cient and unnecessary.5 7  In classifying all but blatant and
conspicuous attorney errors as within the limits of competence,58 the
courts are able to protect counsel's tactical decisions and defense
strategies.59 As the Court noted in Strickland: "There are countless
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best
criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the
same way. '"6 This allows counsel the opportunity to use "creative"
did not suffer prejudice at the hands of his counsel's representation); Fink v. Lockhart,
823 F.2d 204, 207 n.1) (8th Cir. 1987) (ending inquiry on finding that the prejudice
prong of Strickland test was not met).
51. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (1984). Such an inquiry requires a presumption
that counsel did in fact deliver adequate assistance. I& This factor is necessary to pro-
tect the independence of counsel's decisions and strategies which are formed during
trial as facts and evidence become known. Id,
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. See supra note 49.
55. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. The Court specifically illustrated cases where the
assistance of an attorney was denied, using interference with counsel's representation
by the court and conflict of interests between the attorney and the accused as exam-
ples. Id. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-61 (1984) (citing examples of
denial of counsel during trial proceedings); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)
(court may have obligation to prevent conflicts of interest in defendant's representa-
tion); see generally infra pp. 40-43 (distinguishing the problems that arise when con-
flict-free counsel is waived and competent counsel is waived). Cf Maxwell v. Superior
Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982) (holding where defend-
ant's fee contract with his attorney gave the attorney rights to the defendant's life
story, the resulting conflict was determined waivable).
56. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
57. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
58. Id. at 690-91.
59. Id. at 689.
60. Id.
defenses which, may succeed.61
C. The Right to Waive Counsel
Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is guaranteed
the right to counsel. 62 Incorporated within this right is the right to
waive counsel63 and represent oneself in a criminal proceeding.6 4 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court in Faretta v. California65 held that,
under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the right to
waive the assistance of counsel and to represent himself at trial.66
Because courts have relied upon Faretta in determining the applica-
ble waiver standard where a defendant wishes to proceed with in-
competent counsel,67 an analysis of the Court's decision is necessary.
In Faretta, the defendant, Anthony Faretta, was on trial for grand
theft. Although he was represented by an appointed public defender,
Faretta asked the court for permission to represent himself at trial.
This request was made after Faretta became aware of his appointed
counsel's heavy caseload. After a thorough inquiry by the judge into
FAretta's background and experience, and despite admonitions
against self representation, Faretta's waiver of counsel was allowed
by the court.68 The court, however, instructed Faretta that if it ap-
peared he was inadequately representing himself, the waiver would
be revoked.69
The judge held a hearing to determine Faretta's competency to
represent himself, examining Faretta on specific areas of law.70
Based on this hearing, the judge revoked Faretta's waiver, declaring
that Faretta had not made an "intelligent and knowing" waiver of his
right to receive counsel and that there was "no constitutional right to
61. Id
62. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (extending the right to ap-
pointed counsel to situations of imprisonment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342
(1963) (discussing the requirement of appointing counsel to an indigent felon). The
Criminal Justice Act also provides a statutory right to appointment of counsel: "The
United States magistrate or the court, if satisfied after appropriate inquiry that the [ac-
cused] is financially unable to obtain counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent him."
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
63. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
64. Id.
65. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
66. Id. at 819.
67. See United States v. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. 847, 855 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), qff'd,
United States v. Raife, 607 F.2d 1000 (2d Cir. 1979); People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180,
387 N.E.2d 688 (1979).
68. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 808.
69. Id. The judge instructed Faretta that he would receive no special treatment
from the court and that he would be expected to follow normal court procedures in
representing himself at trial. Id.
70. Id. at 808 n.3.
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conduct his own defense."71 Faretta subsequently related his desire
to act as co-counsel.72 His request was rejected and the public de-
fender was ordered to carry out the remainder of Faretta's defense.
Faretta was found guilty,7 3 and on appeal, the California Court of
Appeal upheld the conviction, agreeing with the trial court that
Faretta was not entitled to represent himself.74
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that a criminal
defendant has the right to represent himself at trial.75 The Court
stated that the right "has been protected by statute since the begin-
nings of our Nation."76 In its ruling, the Court set forth the plain
meaning of the Sixth Amendment: "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not
provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants
to the accused personally the right to make his defense." 77 The
Court held that even though the Sixth Amendment does not specifi-
cally mention the right of self-representation, 78 this right is firmly
within the category of rights which are "essential to due process of
law in a fair adversary process."79
The Court emphasized that an accused's right to receive assistance
of counsel is furnished as an aid,80 not as an imposition of the govern-
ment upon an unconsenting defendant. "Unless the accused has ac-
quiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the
defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense,
it is not his defense."
8
'
The Court declared that an accused may waive the assistance of
71. Id at 809, 810 & n.4. The judge found that "the ends of justice and require-
ments of due process require that the prior order permitting the defendant to repre-
sent himself in pro per should be and is hereby revoked. That privilege is terminated."
Id. at 810 n.4.
72. Id. at 810. In addition, Faretta requested several times for appointment of
counsel other than a public defender. Id. at 810 n.5.
73. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 811.
74. Id. at 811-12.
75. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975).
76. Id. at 812.
77. Id. at 819.
78. Id. at 819 & n.15. "The right to self-representation - to make one's own de-
fense personally - is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment."
See also Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("the Sixth
Amendment contains an implied constitutional right to waive the assistance of
counsel").
79. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15.
80. Id. at 820. "The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that
counsel ... shall be an aid to a willing defendant - not an organ of the State interposed
between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally." Id.
81. Id at 821 (emphasis in original).
counsel and proceed pro se if a valid waiver is knowingly and intelli-
gently made.8 2 This is to ensure that the defendant is "aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so that the record
will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with his eyes open.' "83 The trial judge must inquire into and advise
the defendant of the dangers and complications associated with the
decision to proceed pro se.8 4 Such inquiry should be reflected on the
court record as an explicit dialogue to protect against reversal.85 Be-
cause a defendant has a constitutional right to receive counsel, until
that right is validly waived, a court which allows a defendant to
proceed without a valid waiver is in essence denying the defendant
constitutional protection.8 6 Therefore, an implied waiver of a consti-
tutional right is generally not presumed.8 7 To be effective, a valid
waiver must be received by the court, and reflected on the court
record.88
In electing to represent himself, an accused abandons his right to
competent counsel and loses the opportunity to argue ineffectiveness
of counsel upon appeal.8 9 However, the right to represent oneself is
not absolute and the trial judge may restrict, prevent, or terminate
the defendant's pro se status if the trial proceedings are seriously dis-
rupted.90 A trial court's arbitrary disallowance of a valid waiver is
grounds for reversal.91
82. Id. at 835.
83. Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
84. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. See also Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24
(1948) (extent of investigation dependant upon circumstances); United States v. Welty,
674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982) (the facts and circumstances of the case must be
evaluated).
85. See Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 708, 724 (1948); United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d
1485, 1490 (9th Cir. 1987); McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174, 1177 (5th Cir. 1985)
(points to be considered by trial court in accepting a waiver), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852
(1985); see generally United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 110 (4th Cir. 1988) (discuss-
ing what the record should disclose about the defendant's waiver), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1211 (1988); United States v. Williamson, 806 F.2d 216, 220 (10th Cir. 1986) (where
defendant was not uneducated, explanation on record regarding defendant's sixth
amendment rights provided sufficient proof of valid waiver).
86. See United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1489-90 (9th. Cir. 1987); Moreno v.
Estelle, 717 F.2d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1983) (the defendant's sixth amendment right to re-
ceive counsel applies unless properly waived), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 975 (1984).
87. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). See supra note 86.
88. See United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 1321 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1987); Fitzpatrick
v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057, 1065-67 (11th Cir. 1986).
89. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 & n.46. See United States v. Trapnell, 638 F.2d 1016,
1029 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167-68 (10th Ci. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980).
90. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 & n.46. See Davis v. Morris, 719 F.2d 324, 325-26 (9th
Cir. 1983) (denying defendant the right to proceed pro se due to disruption and the ob-
jective lack of competence that defendant displayed).
91. United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 820 (3d Cir. 1988).
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D. The Right to Counsel of Choice
Labelled "the most important decision a defendant makes in shap-
ing his defense," 92 a significant body of case law supports the consti-
tutional right to choose one's counsel.93 In Powell v. Alabama,94 the
Supreme Court observed that a criminal defendant has the right to
obtain the counsel of his choice.95 The United States Supreme Court
has restated this prerogative on numerous occasions.96 This right is
viewed as an implied right, "part and parcel of the [constitutionally
guaranteed] right to the assistance of counsel."97 However, there is
generally no constitutional right for an indigent defendant to demand
the appointment of a particular attorney.9 8
The principle involved in these cases centers around the protection
of an individual's right to present his own defense.99 The ability to
choose an attorney whom a defendant feels will best represent his in-
terests is paramount. The accused's right to select his personal
means of defense shows that "respect for the individual which is the
92. United States V. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 667 F.2d 365 (3d
Cir. 1981).
93. Id. at 53. See United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 1982); Gandy
v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214,
1219 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977); Harling v. United
States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1104 (D.C. 1978).
For an overview of the recent positions taken by federal courts concerning the right
to counsel of choice, see United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (2d Cr. 1991); United
States v. Stuckey, 917 F.2d 1537 (l1th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 972 (1991);
United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, Feb. 4,
1991; United States v. Richardson, 894 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1990); Sizemore v. Fletcher,
921 F.2d 667 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rewald, 889 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 64 (1990); Neal v. Texas, 870 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1989); Fuller v.
Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Perretti v. Fuller, 110 S. Ct. 203
(1989); United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 1988).
94. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
95. Id. at 53.
96. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S.
3 (1954) (reaffirming that the accused's choice of defense counsel must be given
deference).
97. United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 26 (2d Cir. 1982). See Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932); Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Douglas v.
United States, 488 A.2d 121, 141 (D.C. 1985); Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101
(D.C. 1978).
.98. See Carey v. Minnesota, 767 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010
(1985); Ford v. Israel, 701 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 832 (1983);
United States v. Hampton, 757 F.2d 299 (.7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972);
Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970) (no right for an indigent defendant to
demand particular appointed attorney); Burgos v. Murphy, 692 F. Supp 1571 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Wyo. 1978).
99. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).
lifeblood of the law."100 Furthermore, the right to counsel of choice
has been held to directly affect the overall ability of an accused to as-
sist with his own defense.O1 Moreover, some cases have defined this
right to be a component of the due process right of a defendant "to
decide, within limits, the type of defense he wishes to mount."'10 2
Courts have held that the right to counsel of choice includes the
protection against unreasonable interference by a court after counsel
has been appointed or retained by the accused. 0 3 The overriding pol-
icy consideration governs the judiciary's reluctance to interfere with
an established attorney-client relationship.'0 4 For this reason, a court
may not arbitrarily deprive an accused of his choice of counsel if the
accused and his counsel object.' 05 As the court of appeals noted in
Linton v. Perini,i0 6 the "[b]asic trust between counsel and defendant
is the cornerstone of the adversary system and effective assistance of
counsel."107
E. The Right to Counsel of Choice is not a
Constitutional Minimum
Although the right to competent and effective counsel is viewed as
a constitutional minimum, 0 8 the right to counsel of choice is not. 0 9
A trial judge, in the "interests of justice," may remove appointed or
100. Id. at 834 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
101. Id.
102. United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979).
103. See United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1986) (court stating that con-
stitutional rights are at issue when a court interferes with a defendant's actions in ob-
taining counsel); Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Stearnes v.
Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc); Harling v. United States, 387
A.2d 1101 (D.C. 1978).
104. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820 & n.16, 834; Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); Douglas, 488 A.2d at 141; Harling, 387
A.2d at 1105; Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968)
(en banc).
105. See Morris v. Slappy, 421 U.S. 1, 22-26 (1983) (recognizing the interest of the
defendant in continuing with present attorney); Linton, 656 F.2d at 209-11; Gandy v.
Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1327 (5th Cir. 1978) (unfair to remove defendant's attorney);
Harling, 387 A.2d at 1105; Smith, 68 Cal. 2d at 547, 440 P.2d at 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 1;
State ex rel. Eidson v. Edwards, 793 S.W.2d 1, 5 & n.3 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (en banc)
(constitutional considerations associated with arbitrary removal); Stearnes, 780 S.W.2d
at 220-22.
106. 656 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1981).
107. Id, at 212.
108. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). See also supra note 23.
109. Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-13 (holding no denial of right to choice of counsel when
defendant's motion for continuance to obtain attorney was denied); United States v.
DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1987) (defendant's choice of counsel not de-
nied when court prohibited defendant from continuing with counsel who was simulta-
neously representing other defendants).
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retained counsel.11o Therefore, in some instances, a defendant may
be prohibited from exercising this right."'
A balancing test has been employed to determine an accused's
right to counsel of choice."i 2 The right of an individual to personally
choose his defense is weighed against the governmental interests of a
fair trial and judicial efficiency."13 A court may deny a defendant the
right to counsel of his choice if that right seriously compromises the
integrity of the trial process.'1 4 However, in such a situation the
scales tip in the defendant's favor when one considers that an arbi-
trary denial of choice of counsel may be per se reversible.ii5 A trial
court must give due weight to the defendant's need to choose his de-
fense counsel.116 In this respect, the right to counsel of choice is
analogous to the defendant's right to self-representation."17
II. WAIVERS OF EFFECTIVE COUNSEL: THE BEGINNINGS
Courts have recognized the right to waive effective assistance of
counsel as a component of the right to counsel of choice." 8 A pio-
neering case which has been influential in many later decisions is
Smith v. Superior Court."19 In Smith, the defendant was prosecuted
for murder. The trial judge concluded that the defendant's counsel
was "incompetent," noting the counsel's inability to handle a capital
110. Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1105 (D.C. 1978).
111. Id. The court gave an attorney's severe incompetence, physical inability to try
a case, and disruptive conduct as examples. See also United States v. Rogers, 471 F.
Supp. 847 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (attorney's old age and hearing problem presented difficulty
for court resulting in the court mandating his removal).
112. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1983); Sampley v. Attorney General, 786
F.2d 610, 613 (4th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 478 U.S. 1008 (1986).
113. Morris, 461 U.S. at 23 n.5; Sampley, 786 F.2d at 613.
114. Sampley, 786 F.2d at 613.
115. See Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 607-08 (3d Cir. 1989); Linton v. Perini, 656
F.2d 207, 211-12 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982). When compared to
the standard of proof required for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this stan-
dard appears to be easier for a defendant to meet because, under Strickland, a defend-
ant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show actual prejudice to obtain a
reversal. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
116. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
117. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 267-68 (1984) (proposing this anal-
ogy); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820-21, 833 (1975).
118. See Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 559, 440 P.2d 65, 72, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1,
8 (1968) (en banc); McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18, 22-23 (Alaska 1974); Douglas v.
United States, 488 A.2d 121, 140-43 (D.C. 1985); People v. Escarcega, 186 Cal. App. 3d
379, 397, 230 Cal. Rptr. 638, 647 (1986).
119. 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968) (en banc).
trial and his poor courtroom demeanor.120 Despite the defendant's
repeated objections, the trial judge removed the defendant's ap-
pointed counsel,121
120. Smith, 68 Cal. 2d at 549, 440 P.2d at 68, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 4-5.
121. Id. The trial judge appointed Mr. Kanarek to represent the defendant Smith
at his trial. During the proceedings, Kanarek requested a continuance to enable him
to further research his case. The pertinent sections of the colloquy between the parties
is reproduced:
The court: "Mr. Kanarek, have you ever tried a death penalty matter before
as a trial lawyer?"
Mr. Kanarek: (replied that he did not think that he had).
The court: "There is a question that has come up in the Court's mind which I
must resolve as to whether I feel Mr. Kanarek has the experience and the
ability to represent Mr. Smith in a charge as serious as this. And I want to do
some research as to that problem and confer with the presiding judge and
then hear from Mr. Kanarek, if he wishes to be heard, and indicate my own
opinion, whether my doubt has been resolved or not. If I find that Mr.
Kanarek is not, by experience of training or knowledge, capable of represent-
ing Mr. Smith, he will be relieved and a new attorney will be appointed by the
Court."
Mr. Kanarek: (objecting) "Well, your Honor, I might state that your Honor's
statements are denying a right to counsel to Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith has asked
me to prepare an affidavit of prejudice against your Honor.... "
The court: "Mr. Kanarek has indicated to this Court that he has never ap-
peared as the attorney of record in the trial of a death penalty case.... I feel
Mr. Kanarek is not capable of representing Defendant Smith. In view of the
very serious nature of the charge in this case, in view of the fact that a previ-
ous jury has found this defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and rec-
ommended the death penalty, this Court has a special duty to see that Mr.
Smith gets the finest representation possible .... [T]he Court at this time will
vacate the order . .. appointing Mr. Kanarek ......
Mr. Kanarek: "May I be heard, Judge?"
The court: "No, Mr. Kanarek, you may not. . . . You are relieved, Mr.
Kanarek." (The judge then appointed substitute counsel to represent the
defendant).
Defendant Smith: "I object to this attorney being appointed and I'd like to
have the record reflect that, your Honor. I have some say so, I think .... Af-
ter nearly four and one-half years of intimate contact with my case ... Mr. I.
A. Kanarek is indispensable to me, and I want Mr. Kanarek, and no other at-
torney, to represent me. Mr. Kanarek has had more than four years studying
these transcripts. He's had many, many conferences with me and we have dis-
cussed this case in detail. We are agreeable - I agree with the defenses that
he is going to take in the upcoming trial and I have all the faith in the world
in him as an attorney."
The court: "You have made the point with the Court and it is in the record
that you want Mr. Kanarek as your lawyer; that you don't want [the substi-
tuted counsel]; that you will not cooperate with him. I can't make you cooper-
ate with [him].... If you decide that you will not cooperate with [him], that's
your responsibility, not the Court's ......
The defendant: "[Y]ou are forcing me to proceed with this trial with an attor-
ney who I really violently object to, really violently, and that I will not coop-
erate, your Honor, but rather give up my life, because I know my cooperation
is important to this attorney .... I will not disclose these witnesses to this
[substitute counsel] because I don't have any confidence in him, your Honor."
The court: "I think you are very foolish, very childish, but it is your life, Mr.
Smith, and if you don't want to divulge to [him] the witnesses you say you
have, and the evidence you say you have, and you wish to sit by and let a jury
find you guilty and sentence you to the death penalty, there is nothing I can
do about it."
Id. at 551-57, 440 P.2d at 61-71, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 3-7.
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The California Supreme Court, sitting en banc, faced the "unprece-
dented" situation of determining whether a trial judge had the au-
thority to remove counsel over the objections of both the defendant
and his attorney. 122 The court disapproved of the trial court's actions
and declared that a trial judge does not have the authority to remove
counsel, thereby depriving a defendant of his attorney because the
trial judge subjectively feels the attorney is incompetent. 123
The court rejected the concept that this would leave a trial judge
helpless when faced with incompetent counsel.i24 The court listed
the many options available to a trial judge to protect the court pro-
ceedings.125 Foremost among these choices is the "judge's ultimate
weapon ... the summary contempt power."126 The court, however,
cautioned trial judges that the contempt power is to be used only
with "great caution."127 The court expressed that replacing incompe-
tent counsel would expose the independence of the legal profession
to greater jeopardy than even an unjustified use of contempt:
[I]t is the duty of the trial judge to protect the defendant's right to a counsel
who is effective. But in discharging that duty the judge must be on his guard
neither to infringe upon the defendant's right to counsel of his choice, nor to
compromise the independence of the bar...
All will agree that if the defendant's attorney exhibits objective evidence of
physical incapacity to proceed with a meaningful defense of his client, such as
illness, intoxication, or a nervous breakdown, the court need not sit idly by; it
should inquire into the matter on its own motion, and if necessary relieve the
affected counsel and order a substitution. Yet even that action should be
taken with great circumspection and only after all reasonable alternatives,
such as the granting of a continuance, have been exhausted. Failure to ob-
serve these standards, although in a case of undisputed physical incapacity of
counsel, will compel a reversal of the ensuing judgment; and this result will
follow regardless of whether the defendant's substituted counsel was compe-
tent or whether the defendant received a 'fair trial' with respect to the guilt-
determining process . .. '[T]he state's duty [is] to refrain from unreasonable
interference with the individual's desire to defend himself in whatever man-
ner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command.'12 8
122. Id. at 559, 440 P.2d at 72, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
123. Id. at 559, 440 P.2d at 73, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
124. Id. at 560, 440 P.2d at 73, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
125. The court stated:
[T]he judge may intervene .. .by disallowing pleas or motions to withdraw
pleas, controlling the scope of examination, questioning witnesses himself,
making appropriate suggestions as to the items or order of proof, commenting
on the evidence, admonishing or instructing the jury on his own motion, or
exercising any of his other inherent powers over the conduct of the proceed-
ings to insure that the defendant receives a fair trial.
Smith, 68 Cal. 2d at 560, 440 P.2d at 73, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 559, 440 P.2d at 72-73, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 8-9 (citations omitted) (quoting
The Smith court began its analysis by stating that an attorney is
pronounced competent to practice law in being admitted to the
bar.129 An attorney would not be able to effectively represent his cli-
ent if he worked under the insecurity that a judge could remove him
at any time for being incompetent.130 The court thus agreed with the
defense counsel's argument, which stated:
[I]f the advocate must labor under threat that, at any moment.., he may be
summarily relieved as counsel on a subjective charge of incompetency by the
very trial judge he is attempting to convince, his advocacy must of necessity be
most guarded and lose much of its force and effect.
1 3 1
The court concluded that a trial judge does not have the authority
to dismiss a counsel on the grounds of potential or suspected incom-
petency.132 If another rule were adopted by the court, the result
would compromise the attorney's ability to effectively advocate for
the accused and would potentially interfere with the fairness of the
proceedings. 3 3 By protecting the defendant's right to continue with
his present counsel, the attorney-client relationship is protected from
arbitrary disruption by the trial judge.' 34
A. Arbitrary Removal of Counsel is Unjustified
A court may not arbitrarily remove and substitute the defendant's
counsel over the objections of the defendant or his attorney. 3 5 The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals analyzed the reasons why the
right to counsel of choice must not be unreasonably interfered with
in Harling v. United States.136
In Harling, the defendant was charged with murder in the first de-
gree. An attorney, Shellie Bowers, was appointed to represent the
defendant at trial. During the defendant's pretrial status hearing, an
exchange occurred between the trial judge and Bowers.137 The trial
People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d 199, 206, 417 P.2d 868, 873, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284, 289 (1966))
(emphasis added).
129. 1& at 559, 440 P.2d at 73, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
130. Smith, 68 Cal. 2d at 561, 440 P.2d at 74, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
131. Id (quoting Mr. Kanarek, counsel for the defense).
132. Id at 562, 440 P.2d at 75, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
133. See i&
134. See i&
135. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) (deference must be given to accused's
choice of counsel).
136. 387 A.2d 1101 (D.C. 1978).
137. When attorney Bowers motioned the court for the names of government wit-
nesses, the court denied the motion and the following colloquy occurred:
Bowers: "I would have to state to Your Honor, now, this man will receive inef-
fective assistance of counsel if I walk into the courtroom."
The court: "Are you retained or appointed?"
Bowers: "I was Court appointed."
The court: "Then I'll strike you and appoint somebody else. Strike Mr. Bow-
ers and have another attorney appointed."
Bowers: "May I complete the statement for Your Honor?"
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judge, apparently in reaction to Bowers' discovery motion, and with-
out permitting Bowers to explain his reasoning, removed Bowers and
ordered a substitution of the defendant's counsel.138 Both Bowers
and the defendant objected to the removal. The defendant expressed
that such actions by the court would prejudice him, noting the exist-
ence of an attorney-client relationship between himself and
Bowers. 3 9
The trial judge refused the request to reinstate Bowers, stating:
"Denied - The Court is paying for counsel, not the deft."140 After
the defendant was convicted, he appealed, claiming that he was de-
prived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.141
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the sentence,
and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate Bowers as the
defendant's attorney.142 Generally, trial courts have the power to re-
move an appointed attorney,143 and indigent defendants usually do
not have the right to demand the appointment of any particular at-
torney.144 However, once an attorney has been properly appointed to
a defendant, the court may not violate or otherwise unreasonably in-
terfere with the attorney-client relationship that already has
formed.145
The court of appeals held that a trial judge must possess a "justifi-
able basis" for removing an attorney and ordering a substitution of
The court: "You're suggesting if you don't get these names now, the claim will
be ineffective assistance of counsel."
Bowers: "No, I'm not saying that. If Your Honor will hear me out."
The court: "You're not getting them, sir."
Bowers: "I'm saying that if I can't find out some kind of way."
The court: "I'm satisfied you're not going to represent him. Strike Mr. Bow-
ers.... Well, I'm satisfied he needs another lawyer. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bowers that terminates the colloquy, believe me. Thank you very much."
Id. at 1103-04.
138. Id. at 1104.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Harling, 387 A.2d at 1104.
142. Id. at 1106.
143. See Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1104 (D.C. 1978); see generally
United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1979)
(an attorney's contumacious conduct may be grounds for removal); United States v.
Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942, 949 (11th Cir. 1985) (disallowing defendant to continue
with counsel when counsel refused to inform court of identity of retaining party).
144. See Ford v. Israel, 701 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 832 (1983);
Carey v. Minnesota, 767 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985);
United States v. Hampton, 457 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972).
145. Harling, 387 A.2d at 1105; Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
counsel.146 The court found that Bowers' actions were reasonable in
that they were motivated by his duty to advocate his client's cause
and were part of his investigation. 47 Thus, a trial judge does not
have the judicial authority to remove counsel merely because the
judge disagrees with an attorney's actions.148 The court's decision to
substitute counsel must also further "the interests of justice."149 This
leads to the following question: To what extent is a defendant's right
to continue with counsel of choice qualified by the interests of the
judiciary?
B. Counsel May Be Removed in the "Interests of Justice"
Generally, a judge has the duty and ability to protect the integrity
of the judicial system from disruption, prejudice, and inefficiency.150
This duty may legitimately warrant the removal and substitution of a
defendant's attorney in the interest of justice.151
An example of a warranted removal of counsel was illustrated in
United States v. Rogers,152 where the defendant's right to counsel col-
lided with the judge's duty to administer justice. In Rogers, the de-
fendant, Raife, was charged with armed bank robbery. Attorney
Israel Davidson was retained by Raife to represent him at trial.
Early in the proceedings, Davidson failed to object to certain state-
ments made by the defendant153 and delayed in pursuing other
timely motions. Davidson, then eighty-three years old and suffering
from severe hearing impairment, needed to be much closer to the
jury and the judge's bench so he had the court furniture rearranged.
In addition, Davidson's hearing impairment required the repetition of
many statements, which interfered with the other attorney's
presentation.'5
The court inquired whether the defendant wished to continue with
Davidson as his attorney, stating that all efforts were being made to
accommodate his difficulties. 55 The defendant notified the court
146. Harling, 387 A.2d at 1105.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2603 (1981)) ("The court may, 'in the interest
of justice,' substitute one appointed counsel for another at any stage of the
proceedings").
150. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1983); United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d
248, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1985) (disruption of trial proceedings and efficiency are bases for
removal).
151. See United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 1987) (intentional de-
lay maneuver by defendant); United States v. Tedder, 787 F.2d 540, 543 (10th Cir. 1986)
(no right to lay representation).
152. 471 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 607 F.2d 1000 (2d Cir. 1979).
153. Id. at 849.
154. Id. at 850.
155. Id.
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that he wished to proceed with Davidson due to his present financial
problems.156
During the trial, a juror related her concern about Davidson's com-
petence and asked if she could discuss this with the court. The judge
agreed to speak privately, but on the record, with the juror in his
chambers. He explained to the juror the defendant's right to receive
counsel of his choice. The juror, however, expressed that she could
not render judgment on the case based only on the evidence. In addi-
tion, she related that Davidson was "the center of all the talk in the
[jury] room."157 Despite the defendant's objections, a mistrial was de-
clared due to the number of jurors that were found to be similarly
disposed towards Davidson.158 The government then immediately
moved to disqualify Davidson, believing that recusal was an inade-
quate alternative. 159
The Rogers opinion began with a synopsis of the right to counsel,
stating that "[a]lthough a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right to the effective assistance of competent counsel is absolute...
his concomitant right to counsel of his choice, while entitled to great
respect, is qualified."160
The court then proceeded to define situations in which a defendant
would not be allowed to continue with counsel of choice. Citing
United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle,161 the court restated the rule
that a defendant's interest in representation of choice must be bal-
anced against the "public need for the efficient and effective adminis-
tration of criminal justice."162
Next, the court addressed the ability of a judge to remove counsel
if the counsel's representation does not comply with "fundamental
professional and ethical standards."163 The court maintained that
there is no right to be defended by a layperson or by a person who
has been disbarred.164 Most significant, however, is the situation that
156. Id. The defendant stated that he could not afford another attorney since his
family was in the proces of going "broke." Id. His father was "working two jobs
now" and they were attempting "to sell the car in order to finish paying the [attor-
ney's] fee." Id.
157. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. at 850.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 851.
161. 409 F.2d 1210, 1214 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970).
162. United States v. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. 847, 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting United
States ex rel. Carey, 409 F.2d at 1214), aff'd, 607 F.2d 1000 (2d Cir. 1979).
163. Id. at 852.
164. Id. at 852-53.
occurs when an attorney's representation compromises the proceed-
ings before the court:
[T]he court may bar an attorney from further participation at trial when he
persists in disrupting the orderly course of proceedings and refuses to comply
with rulings and directions of the court.... No hard and fast rules govern the
exercise of this power; the decision lies within the sound discretion of the trial
judge who must undertake to balance, on a sui generis basis, the sixth amend-
ment interest of the accused and the court's and public's interest in fair and
orderly proceedings.1 65
To illustrate its point, the court referred to the decision in United
States v. Dinitz.166 In Dinitz, the defendant's attorney, appearing pro
hac vice, refused to obey the court's admonitions when making his
opening statement. The Dinitz court held it was appropriate for the
judge to order an attorney out of the courtroom if his actions jeop-
ardized the proceedings at hand.167
However, the Rogers court drew a distinction between the non-
complying counsel in Dinitz and Davidson's incompetence. 68 The
court felt that although Davidson's actions were not intentionally dis-
ruptive or malicious towards the court or opposing counsel, he was
nonetheless interfering with the court proceedings. 169 Therefore,
this situation gave rise to the court's prerogative to disqualify David-
son. The court stated that "[w]here the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess is at stake the court must surely possess the power to take
whatever steps are necessary to preserve the orderly course of pro-
ceedings and to cure [the] 'incipient miscarriage of justice .... ,"'170
The court found that Davidson's representation fit within this sce-
nario by falling "far short of the level of competency required of
criminal defense counsel."171 Davidson's failure to engage in discov-
ery, his untimely motions, and his disruption by requiring a repeti-
tion of clearly spoken evidence, "subvert[ed] the integrity of the fact-
finding process."' 72 Therefore, by employing a balancing test, the
court found that the judicial interest in protecting the defendant's
trial outweighed the defendant's right to continue with Davidson as
his attorney. 73
It is important to note that the Rogers court's decision differs from
a subjective finding of incompetence by a trial judge. In Rogers, the
counsel's removal was based on definitive visible actions by Davidson
165. Id. at 853.
166. 538 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977).
167. Id. at 1223-24.
168. United States v. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. 847, 853-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, United
States v. Raife, 607 F.2d 1000 (2d Cir. 1979).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 854 (quoting United States v. Williams, 411 F. Supp. 854, 858 (S.D.N.Y.
1976)).
171. Id. at 855.
172. Id. at 856.
173. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. at 856.
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which objectively demonstrated his incompetence. His actions di-
rectly influenced and distracted the jury in their consideration of evi-
dence. In addition, Davidson's actions jeopardized not only the
defendant's case, but also interfered with the prosecution's ability to
advocate.174 Davidson was not relieved as attorney merely because
the judge subjectively felt that he was incompetent, but because he
was objectively incompetent and severely diminished the trial court's
ability to maintain order.175 It is also important to note that the trial
judge did not emphasize that the defendant had a greater right to
continue with Davidson because he had been personally retained.
The courts have firmly declared that the right to continue with coun-
sel of choice is independent of whether counsel is appointed or
retained.176
C. Appointed Counsel and Retained Counsel Must Be
Treated Equally
This rule was thoroughly examined in Harling v. United States, 77
where the District of Columbia Court of Appeals declared that the
trial judge was mistaken in drawing a distinction between whether
the defense attorney had been appointed by the court or personally
retained by the defendant. 178 Whether the court pays for counsel, or
the defendant pays for counsel, the same opportunity for a trusting
attorney-client relationship exists.179 The appellate court's reasoning
followed that of the Smith case:
A superficial response is that the defendant does not pay his fee, and hence
has no ground to complain .... But the attorney-client relationship is not that
elementary; it involves not just the casual assistance of a member of the bar,
but an intimate process of consultation and planning which culminates in a
state of trust and confidence between the client and his attorney. This is par-
ticularly essential, of course, when the attorney is defending the client's life or
174. Id. at 850.
175. Id
176. Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 561-62, 440 P.2d 65, 74-75, 68 Cal. Rptr.
1, 10-11 (1968) (en banc); Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1105-06 (D.C. 1978).
177. 387 A.2d 1101 (D.C. 1978). For a discussion of Harling, see supra notes 138-49
and accompanying text.
178. Harling, 387 A.2d at 1104-06. See also People v. Davis, 114 Ill. App. 3d 537, 561,
449 N.E.2d 237, 241 (1983) (trial court erred in believing it had authority to revoke an
attorney's appointment at will based on attorney's conduct because court-appointed
and retained counsel must be treated equally).
179. Harling, 387 A.2d at 1105-06. See English v. State, 8 Md. App. 330, 335, 259
A.2d 822, 826 (1969) (whether defendant's attorney was appointed or personally re-
tained, "the accused is entitled to the assistance of that counsel at trial") (emphasis in
original); Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 561-62, 440 P.2d 65, 74-75, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 10-11 (1968) (en banc).
liberty. Furthermore, the relationship is independent of the source of com-
pensation .... To hold otherwise would be to subject that relationship to an
unwarranted and invidious discrimination arising merely from the poverty of
the accused.1 80
This issue has been addressed more recently by the South Dakota
Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals. In In re Civil
Contempt Proceedings Concerning Richard,181 an appointed attorney
who was acting on behalf of a grand jury witness was cited for con-
tempt. The trial judge felt that the attorney was giving improper ad-
vice to the witness, thereby hindering the investigation. 8 2 The
South Dakota Supreme Court relied on Harling in ruling that the
trial court had improperly removed the attorney.18 3
Similarly, in In Re M.R.S.,184 a trial judge removed appointed coun-
sel for a juvenile defendant. The court of appeals, citing Smith and
Harling, decided that "[a]n inviolate attorney-client relationship had
been created and should not be arbitrarily disturbed. The fact that
the county was paying for counsel does not in and of itself provide
the trial court with sufficient justification for arbitrary removal."185
Therefore, an attorney appointed by the court is entitled to and
should receive the same deference and treatment as a retained attor-
ney, all circumstances being equal. A denial of this right based upon
a determination of who pays for counsel's salary is an arbitrary de-
nial that is both unfair and unconstitutional. 86
D. What if Replacement Counsel is Competent?
In conclusion, the Harling court examined an important counter-
argument. The prosecution proposed that even if the defendant loses
his ability to proceed with the counsel of his choice, his appeal should
be precluded since he received competent substitute counsel and was
therefore unprejudiced. The court disagreed, stating that even a for-
tuitous outcome for the defendant is "irrelevant" and still requires
reversal.18 7 If a defendant is denied counsel of choice, and so argues
on appeal, this argument is distinct from the argument of ineffective
counsel.188 The right denied to the defendant is the right to assist-
180. Harling, 387 A.2d at 1105-06 (citing Smith, 68 Cal. 2d 561-62, 440 P.2d at 74, 68
Cal. Rptr. at 10).
•181. 373 N.W.2d 429 (S.D. 1985).
182. Id. at 432-33.
183. Id. at 432.
184. 400 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
185. Id. at 152.
186. See McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 217 & n.14 (8th Cir. 1974); Monroe v.
United States, 389 A.2d 811, 820 (D.C. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978) (drawing
a distinction between retained and appointed counsel serves no purpose in an incompe-
tence analysis).
187. Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1106 (D.C. 1978).
188. Id.
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ance of counsel, not that of effective assistance of counsel.189 The
court cited as authority the Supreme Court's ruling in Glasser v.
United States,190 in which the Court held that "[t]he right to have the
assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts
to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising
from its denial." 91 Therefore, notwithstanding a lack of prejudicial
representation, a defendant's denial of the right to choice of counsel
may be raised on appeal.192
III. THE RIGHT TO WAIVE COMPETENT COUNSEL: REQUIREMENTS
The majority of cases which have dealt with a criminal defendant's
right to waive competent counsel have followed the rationale of waiv-
ing effective counsel enumerated in Smith v. Superior Court.i93 In
their attempts to recognize this novel qualified right to waive compe-
tent counsel, the courts have expanded the concept of pro se repre-
sentation and the right to counsel of choice.' 94 Additionally, the
courts have analogized the right to waive competent counsel with the
right to waive conflict-free counsel. 95 In this examination of the
available case law, particular reference will be made to those cases
where the defendant was allowed to retain and proceed with incom-
petent counsel during his criminal trial.196 This section attempts to
define the standard by which courts should accept waivers of compe-
tence. The courts have apparently adopted a waiver standard which
incorporates the Faretta waiver of counsel, demonstrated either by
an express waiver or by a clear "on the record" account of the trial
court's actions in receiving the waiver. The initial waiver require-
ment, as delineated in Faretta v. California,197 mandates that the de-
fendant make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights.98 The
189. Id.
190. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
191. Id. at 76, cited in Harling, 387 A,2d at 1106.
192. See Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101 (D.C. 1978).
193. See Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc); In Re
M.R.S., 400 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Escarcega, 186 Cal. App.
3d 379, 230 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1986).
194. See People v. Escarcega, 186 Cal. App. 3d 379, 230 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1986); People
v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 387 N.E.2d 688 (1979).
195. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d
216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc); Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101 (D.C.
1978).
196. See supra note 193.
197. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
198. Id, at 835.
first case defines the prerequisites for court acceptance of a defend-
ant's waiver.
A. Knowingly, Intelligently, Voluntarily: Faretta Revisited
People v. Johnson 199 involved a case of first impression in the state
of Illinois.200 The defendant, Johnson, was charged with battery and
cruelty to children.20 1 On the second day of trial, the judge observed
that Johnson's retained counsel was providing inadequate legal rep-
resentation.20 2 A meeting was held in chambers where the judge,
court reporter, Johnson, and his retained counsel conferred on the
record.20 3
The judge privately informed Johnson of his dual rights to receive
competent counsel and to choose his attorney. The judge also made
an inquiry into Johnson's own competence and divulged reasons why
he felt Johnson's counsel was incompetent. 204 The judge further told
Johnson that he could proceed with his present counsel, but would be
barred from raising an incompetence of counsel argument because
that right would have been properly waived. Finally, Johnson was
explicitly informed of his right to alternative counsel, that appointed
counsel was in fact available without cost to him, and that a mistrial
would be declared should Johnson wish to replace his attorney.205
Johnson was then instructed to discuss this matter with his family
and his retained counsel to decide how he wished to proceed.
Johnson expressed that he wished to remain with his retained
counsel. The trial court found Johnson's actions to be a valid waiver
of his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.2 06 Johnson was
subsequently convicted and as one basis of his appeal, he claimed in-
effectiveness of counsel.20 7
199. People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 387 N.E.2d 688 (1979).
200. People v. Johnson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 819, 820, 378 N.E.2d 786, 787 (1978) (the Ap-
pellate Court of Illinois stated, "[N]o case telling us what the trial judge should have
done has been called to our attention . . . no case has ruled whether [the defendant]
has a right to proceed by counsel who, although licensed, is deemed by the trial court
to be incompetent."), rev'd, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 387 N.E.2d 688 (1979).
201. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d at 183, 387 N.E.2d at 688.
202. I& at 184, 387 N.E.2d at 688.
203. Id
204. Id. The judge asked the defendant about his educational level. The judge,
feeling that defendant was capable of understanding what he had to say, informed the
defendant that he felt his counsel was incompetent. He mentioned the defense coun-
sel's inappropriate questions and failure to bring objections which "may have seriously
prejudiced defendant's case." Id, at 184, 387 N.E.2d at 689.
205. Id. at 184, 387 N.E.2d at 690. The judge weighed as an alternative possibility
the appointment of assistant or advisory counsel, but decided that it was too late in the
trial to do so. Id at 184-85, 387 N.E.2d at 690.
206. See People v. Johnson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 819, 820, 378 N.E.2d 786, 787.(1978).
207. Id
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The appellate court reversed,2 8 explaining that although the trial
judge had made a "most diligent and forthright inquiry into the find-
ing of incompetence and had properly related this fact to the defend-
ant,"2o9 the judge had failed to explain to Johnson the ramifications
of the sentence and the charges he faced.2 10
The Illinois Supreme Court again reversed, finding that the trial
judge's actions were sufficient in that Johnson had indeed made an
effective waiver of his constitutional right.211 The court noted the
awkward situation facing the trial judge, referring to the possibility
of reversal or the alternative of having to declare a mistrial as unde-
sirable consequences of the trial judge's decision.2 12 Citing previous
United States Supreme Court decisions as authority, the court held
that a "clearly established" showing of waiver would be sufficient.213
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. Califor-
nia was postulated by the court to be the controlling standard.214
The court cited to the Faretta waiver, stating that "the defendant's
right to counsel of his own choice, like Faretta's right to represent
himself... required that he be allowed to make a voluntary, know-
ing and understanding waiver of the right to competent counsel in or-
der to receive the representation of his choice." 215
The Faretta waiver was also cited by the court for the proposition
that if a defendant has the right to waive counsel and represent him-
self, then a right to reject a court-appointed attorney also must at-
tach, or interference with the right to proceed pro se would result.216
However, the Illinois Supreme Court, in overturning the decision
of the appellate court, drew a distinction between the requirements
of a self-representation waiver and the waiver of competent coun-
sel.217 The court specifically cited Illinois Supreme Court Rule
401(a), which governs receipt of waivers of right to counsel.2 18 The
court noted that a higher standard of duty is imposed on a judge
208. People v. Johnson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 819, 378 N.E.2d 786 (1978).
209. Id, at 820, 378 N.E.2d at 787.
210. Id. at 820-21, 378 N.E.2d at 787-88.
211. People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 188, 387 N.E. 2d 688, 691 (1979).
212. Id. at 185, 387 N.E.2d at 690.
213. Id. at 187, 387 N.E.2d at 691.
214. Id at 186, 387 N.E.2d at 690 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).
215. 1M
216. Id at 185, 387 N.E.2d at 690.
217. Id. at 186, 387 N.E.2d at 690-91.
218. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401, Waiver of Counsel, states in pertinent part:
Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a
waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprison-
when accepting a complete waiver of counsel than that imposed
when accepting a waiver of competent counsel, stating:
This rule, however, was not intended to apply to the novel situation [of waiv-
ing competent counsel] . .. [tihe rule applies when a criminal defendant
waives counsel entirely and elects, instead, to represent himself. Here, de-
fendant did not seek to waive counsel and represent himself, but, rather,
elected to proceed with counsel of his own choosing despite the judge's cau-
tion... that counsel was incompetent." 2 1 9
The court further concluded that the fact that Johnson did not re-
ceive an explanation of the charges brought against him was unim-
portant.2 20 In this finding, the court emphasized a totality of the
circumstances approach, focusing specifically on whether Johnson
was "sufficiently aware of the likely consequences of continuing with
incompetent counsel."221 Based on the court's conclusions, a defend-
ant must demonstrate a sufficient knowledge of the surrounding cir-
cumstances and the likely potential results of his actions.2 2 2 If this
determination points to a knowing, voluntary, and understanding re-
linquishment of rights, the court must then adequately reflect and
preserve this waiver in the trial record.2 2 3
B. Express Finding or Clearly on the Record
Courts, in general, are hesitant to recognize waivers of constitu-
tional rights.2 2 4 However, a court record replete with admonish-
ments and recommendations directed by the trial judge to the
defendant concerning the repercussions of his waiver will suffice.225
ment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, in-
forming him of and determining that he understands the following:
(1) The nature of the charge;
(2) The minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including...
the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected...; and
(3) That he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel ap-
pointed for him by the court.
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure and Rules of Court, State and Federal, 1990, ILL. S. CT.
R. 401 (West 1990).
219. People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 186, 387 N.E.2d 688, 691 (i979).
220. Id. at 187-88, 387 N.E.2d at 691.
221. Id. at 188, 387 N.E.2d at 691. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970) ("[waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences"); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waivers must be
intentional).
222. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d at 188, 387 N.E.2d at 691.
223. Id. at 188, 387 N.E.2d at 691.
224. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (waivers of counsel are not
presumed due to the overriding interest of a fair trial); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501, 515 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (presumption against waiver of a constitutional
right); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (holding silence of defendant does
not imply a waiver of counsel).
225. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (waiver must be knowing and
intelligent); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948) (holding a "penetrating and
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In People v. Escarcega,226 the issue before the California Court of
Appeal was whether a criminal defendant could waive the adequacy
of his representation. The defendant, Raul Escarcega was charged
with kidnapping and robbery, and had been represented at trial by an
appointed attorney, Marvin Part. After a delay of several continu-
ances to accommodate Part's congested calendar, the court asked Es-
carcega if he wished to have another attorney appointed, but
informed him that it would result in another continuance. 227 Es-
carcega stated he desired to continue with Part.
However, Escarcega later enjoined the court for a replacement of
counsel. The court recognized Escarcega's request, appointing
Antonio Sandoval, an attorney who was privately retained by the de-
fendant. Trial was then postponed five additional times.228
Thereafter, the court became concerned with the effectiveness of
Sandoval's representation, noting that Sandoval might be too inexpe-
rienced to handle such serious charges. A meeting was held in cham-
bers, wherein the judge inquired as to Sandoval's abilities and
willingness to continue with the case. Sandoval stated that he wished
to proceed, and upon resuming trial the court privately informed the
defendant of its inquiry. For the record, the judge on two separate
occasions warned Escarcega of his "serious doubts" as to Sandoval's
abilities, and inquired if the defendant wished to have another attor-
ney appointed. The defendant was also instructed that if he chose to
continue with Sandoval, he would be precluded from raising the issue
of Sandoval's incompetence or ineffectiveness on appeal. 229 The de-
comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is ten-
dered" is part of the inquiry).
226. 186 Cal. App. 3d 379, 230 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1986).
227. Although beyond the scope of this article, it is interesting to note that the in-
creasing workload placed upon both the public defender's office and the court system
actually contributes to the incompetency of attorneys during trial. For a good discus-
sion of this relationship, see Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel:
The Impact on Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C.L. REV.
531 (1988).
228. Escarcega, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 378, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
229. Id. at 385, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 640. The colloquy between the Court, Escarcega,
and Sandoval is reproduced here in pertinent part:
The court: "The record will reflect we are in chambers.... What I'm about to
say is not easy.... May I ask you, sir, how long you have been a member of
the bar."
Mr. Sandoval (defense counsel): "Several years, two or three years."
The court: "How many felonies have you tried?"
Mr. Sandoval: "One."
The court: "Okay. Sir, it's my opinion, based upon what I have seen today-
. . . -that I really think you're out of your element in trying a case this seri-
fendant stated several times for the record that he wished to proceed
with Sandoval, and continued with the trial. Escarcega was convicted
by the jury on both charges. He appealed, claiming ineffective assist-
ance of counsel due to lack of an express finding of waiver by the
court.
2 3 0
The California Court of Appeal held that Escarcega had made an
effective waiver of his right to effective representation.23 ' The court
challenged Escarcega's argument that a court must receive an ex-
press waiver of effective counsel stating:
We find factually distinguishable those cases which hold that the court must
make an express finding on the record that defendant voluntarily, intelli-
gently, and knowingly waived his right to counsel. In such cases the record
was either silent or unclear with regard to the nature and scope of the court's
inquiry and defendant's responses concerning the issue of waiver or reflected
an inadequate inquiry by the court ... [where... the record is unambiguous
and reveals a fulsome inquiry by the court, including advisement and admon-
ishments ... substantial evidence suffices.
2 3 2
The court cited to Johnson v. Zerbst 233 when it asserted that the
purpose of mandating an express waiver on the court record is to pre-
vent a waiver by "mere acquiescence." 234 Waivers of constitutional
rights are not to be presumed. 235 In this case, the court of appeal
ous .... [S]everal things have been said on the record already that I think
probably lays the basis for making an assertion that you are ineffective."
Mr. Sandoval: "Okay, Your Honor. You know the problem with this case;
you're right. I have not been prepared.... But given the time that I have had,
I have concentrated especially on trying the case .... Basically that is my
position and I want to try this case."
The court: "All right."
Mr. Semow (Deputy District Attorney): "My question is whether or not the
court feels that in order to protect the record the concerns that the court has
just voiced now should at some point prior to commencement of this trial be
voiced directly to the defendant in open court so that he can make, what the
record may already reflect, is an informed decision as to go ahead but has
never been expressly so voiced by him."
The court: "The record will reflect we're back in open court. The defendant
Mr. Escarcega is present ....
Mr. Escarcega, I have indicated to Mr. Sandoval that based upon what I have
seen in court this afternoon, some of the answers to the questions I've re-
ceived, that although I feel he's probably a very good lawyer in other areas of
the law, particularly in the civil area which is his primary service, I do not feel
or I have serious doubts as to whether or not he is able to take on a case of the
complexity and the seriousness of yours.
However, it is your choice, sir. He is your lawyer. And if you wish to proceed
with him, we will go ahead and proceed.... [Ilf you feel that you would want
other counsel and cannot afford other counsel, the court is prepared to go
ahead and appoint you private counsel. However it must be your choice ...
Now do you wish to proceed with Mr. Sandoval?"
Defendant Escarcega: "Yes."
Id. at 388-92, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 642-44.
230. Id. at 385, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
231. Id. at 399, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
232. Id. at 396-97, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
233. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
234. People v. Escarcega, 186 Cal. App. 3d 379, 396, 230 Cal. Rptr. 638, 646 (1986).
235. Id. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938).
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found that Escarcega had exhibited a complete understanding of the
trial judge's reservations concerning Sandoval's competence. 236 The
court maintained that an express waiver was unnecessary under
these circumstances because the rationale behind an express waiver
was satisfied, stating that, "an express finding is not mandated where
the record fully sets forth the colloquy between the court and defend-
ant concerning the issue of waiver and substantial evidence exists to
support an implied finding of waiver."237
The preceding cases stand for the proposition that if a defendant
demonstrates his choice to continue a trial with incompetent counsel
in a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" manner, a valid waiver of
effective counsel has been given.238 The trial court has the responsi-
bility of ensuring that the defendant has the right to choice of coun-
sel, a right that "can constitutionally be forced to yield only when it
will result in significant prejudice to the defendant himself or in a
disruption of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the
circumstances of the particular case." 239 Finally, the court must
strive to adequately reflect the defendant's waiver in the trial record,
either expressly or through a totality of the circumstances ap-
proach.240 In either case, the importance of the court record in both
protecting the defendant's sixth amendment rights and in preserving
the finality of the judgment is paramount.241
However, this waiver of competent counsel entails a myriad of
other considerations which must be addressed. Part III addressed the
"mechanics" of a court's receipt of a defendant's waiver of competent
counsel. The following section addresses the practical and subtle con-
siderations involved with such waivers and focuses primarily on the
236. Escarcega, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47.
237. ld, at 397, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 646 (emphasis added).
238. See id.
239. Id at 397, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 647 (citing People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d 199, 208,
417 P.2d 868, 894, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284, 290 (1966)). See also Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30
Cal. 3d 606, 614, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982) (stating that a court's determi-
nation of "potential incompetence... usually does not justify court-ordered removal");
State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho 727, 729, 620 P.2d 300, 302 (1980) ("mere lack of confidence
is not necessarily grounds for substitution of counsel in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances").
240. See supra notes 221, 236 & 237.
241. People v. Escarcega, 186 Cal. App. 3d 379, 399, 230 Cal. Rptr. 638, 648 (1986).
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see also State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho 727,
729, 620 P.2d 300, 302 (1980) (where defendant clearly rejected trial judge's attempt to
explain the dangers of proceeding pro se and recommendation that co-counsel should
assist, record was held to be knowing and intelligent).
impact of such waivers upon the defendant, the judge, and the judi-
cial system as a whole.
IV. IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS
Allowing a waiver of a constitutional right affects the interests of
the accused, the practicing bar, and the judicial system at large. But
it is truly the defendant who bears the burden and consequences of
the waiver. The question thus becomes: Why would a defendant re-
linquish his right to competent representation and opt instead for a
substandard attorney to advocate his liberty, and perhaps even his
life?
A. The Viability of the Accused's Defense
The ability of an accused to present an effective defense is substan-
tially decreased if he is represented by an incompetent attorney. 242
Clearly, the accused would be lacking a prudent and skilled advocate
and advisor during the trial. The readily apparent effects of such
counsel include, ineffective discovery243 and questioning of wit-
nesses, 244 inadequate diligence in bringing motions,245 and improper
formulation of defense arguments. 246
Less obvious, but equally prejudicial, are the adverse effects an in-
competent attorney has on the trier of fact.2 4 7 First, a judge whose
patience is tested may be less inclined to grant motions or entertain
defense objections. 2 48 Second, as in United States v. Rogers,2 4 9 the in-
competence of the attorney may prejudice the defendant in the eyes
242. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
243. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986) (lack of proper discovery
is not adequate assistance of counsel).
244. See Montgomery v. Petersen, 846 F.2d 407, 413-16 (7th Cir. 1988) (counsel's
assistance was inadequate because witness not questioned).
245. See Rice v. Marshall, 816 F.2d 1126, 1132 (6th Cir. 1987) (counsel's failure to
make a motion to suppress evidence was denial of competent counsel).
246. See generally Pocaro v. United States, 784 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1986) (counsel's
lack of effective defense presentation was inadequate assistance), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
916 (1986).
247. See Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1985) (trial judge became hostile,
short-tempered and "exploded" due to counsel's waste of time during trial), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985). The trial judge may become biased or prejudiced against
defense counsel, perhaps leading to a situation where less credence is given to the de-
fense efforts.
248. Id. Counsel's incompetence and ineffectiveness may also cause the judge to be
biased against the attorney. An obvious bias of the trial judge may well influence the
jury. See Pocaro v. United States, 784 F.2d 38, 41-42 (1st Cir. 1986) (counsel's actions
caused the judge to react in disbelief by shaking his head and making facial gestures),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 916 (1986).
249. 471 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, United States v. Raife, 607 F.2d 1000
(2d Cir. 1979).
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of the jury, resulting in improper considerations by jurors.250 There-
fore, in deciding to continue with deficient counsel, a defendant may
in fact have these and other considerations in mind.
1. Tactical Moves: A Floor Show
An accused who is confronted with an ominous prosecutorial case
may opt for an attorney's incompetent actions as a trial tactic or stra-
tegic move to cause delay, confusion, or interference with the prose-
cution's case.251 The defendant could also attempt to solicit
sympathy from the jury if he can convince them that he should be
pitied due to his apparent helplessness and 'advocateless' situation.252
The accused's attorney may also play a role in this decision. If
counsel feels that his client has little hope of success, displays of in-
competence during trial may be a conscious decision of both parties.
A defendant's counsel, through his actions, has the capacity to dis-
rupt the trial by encouraging the judge to intervene continuously
with admonitions and guiding remarks.253 In this manner, the attor-
ney may hope to mislead the jury by causing the jurors to focus their
attention on his actions, rather than on the defendant who is on trial.
Incompetence may also be used by an attorney to cause delays in
court,254 perhaps as a means of buying time for other strategies he
wishes to develop. Time is an important element in terms of a wit-
ness' ability to accurately recollect: as time passes, memories may
fade and facts may become confused. From a tactical point of view,
such delays might be employed as a weapon by the defendant and his
counsel.255
Additionally, the defendant's underlying intentions may not be
250. Id. at 850.
251. See id. (accommodations made for hearing impediment of defense attorney dis-
rupted courtroom and frustrated jury).
252. See id. During the trial in Rogers, a juror stated that she could not impartially
render judgment based solely on the facts of the case. She stated that her concern for
the defendant's proper representation was the cause.
253. See id. at 849-50; United States v. Brandt, 196 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1952) (judge's
repeated questioning during trial resulted in reversal); United States v. Wyatt, 442 F.2d
858 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (same). Cf In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Cir. 1972) ("At-
torneys have a right to be persistent, vociferous, contentious, and imposing, even to the
point of appearing obnoxious, when acting in their client's behalf. An attorney may
with impunity take full advantage of the range of conduct that our adversary system
allows"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
254. See United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987) (improp-
erly rejecting defendant's claim for new counsel because court thought it to be a delay-
ing tactic).
255. See, e.g., Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1985) (defense counsel at-
readily visible to the court. The defendant could shield himself be-
hind the "smokescreen" of the attorney-client relationship. This
would enable the defendant to utilize his right to counsel of choice as
a tactical maneuver in playing on the sympathy of the trier of fact.
Moreover, the courts' present general reluctance to interfere with de-
fense counsel's tactics and strategies or the attorney-client relation-
ship may diminish the likelihood of an inquiry into counsel's
actions.2 56 Therefore, the beneficial judicial policy of favoring the in-
dependence of the bar could foreseeably prejudice a proceeding if the
court chooses not to intervene.
2. The Ulterior Motive
A defendant may voluntarily choose to proceed through his trial
with incompetent counsel in the hopes of successfully claiming inef-
fective counsel during the appeal of his conviction.25 7 In this scena-
rio, the defendant could then later claim that the inadequate
assistance of counsel he received adversely prejudiced his ability to
present a reasonable defense.258 As previously discussed, the Strick-
land standard is the yardstick by which incompetency of counsel
claims are evaluated. 259 A defendant may claim a right to counsel of
his choice in an attempt to qualify for a reversal under the Strick-
land test.260 This "future claim" strategy, resulting in additional pe-
titions and appeals, would increase the backlog of cases in an already
overburdened court system.26 '
3. Pure Motives
In citing the importance of an established attorney-client relation-
tempted to delay trial by making continuous motions and objections), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1013 (1985).
256. See Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968)
(en banc); People v. Escarcega, 186 Cal. App. 3d 379, 230 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1986).
257. See People v. Escarcega, 186 Cal. App. 3d 379, 399, 230 Cal. Rptr. 638, 648 (1986)
(A defendant advised during trial of his attorney's incompetence who nevertheless vol-
untarily continues through trial with that attorney, cannot appeal such a claim. "A
contrary rule would impermissibly allow a defendant 'an automatic right to reversal on
appeal should the defense or defenses at trial fail'") (quoting People v. Cook, 13 Cal.
3d 663, 673 n.10, 532 P.2d 148, 154 n.10, 119 Cal. Rptr. 500, 506 n.10 (1975)); People v.
Brownlee, 74 Cal. App. 3d 921, 933-34, 141 Cal. Rptr. 685, 692 (1977).
258. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
259. See supra notes 27-61 and accompanying text.
260. But see People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 425, 426 n.17, 590 P.2d 859, 867 n.17, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 732, 740 n.17 (1979) (en banc) ("The claim of ineffective assistance does not exist
as a tool for reversing validly obtained convictions, but as a means of assuring that
criminal defendants receive the legal assistance to which they are constitutionally
entitled").
261. See, e.g., Ayres, In Baltimore, A Breakdown of Justice, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17,
1991, § 1, at 6, col. 1 (overcrowded dockets); Buckley, Howard County Judges, Prosecu-
tors Struggle With a Crush in the Courts, Wash. Post, June 2, 1991, at B5 (prosecutors'
and judges' caseloads have "quadrupled in the past decade").
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ship,26 2 courts have correctly realized that a defendant's decision to
continue with incompetent counsel may be based on factors other
than harassment and the possibility of appeal.263
First, a defendant may not acknowledge the judge's concerns as
genuine if he perceives the judge as a part of the "governmental en-
tity" that is pitted against him. The defendant may misperceive that
the judge's attempt to remove his defense attorney as the govern-
ment's attempt to mislead or incorrectly advise him, thereby increas-
ing his risk of incarceration. From a defendant's perspective, why
should he listen to a judge when the visible governmental intent is to
convict him? A defendant with this frame of mind might very well
trust only his advocate and counsel, even if that counsel is declared
by other parties to be incompetent.
Second, there may exist a firmly established attorney-client rela-
tionship between the accused and his defense counsel.26 4 The de-
fendant may have disclosed a significant amount of confidential
information to his attorney, who, in turn, may have expended a great
deal of time striving to gain the defendant's trust. Thus, the defend-
ant may wish to continue with his present attorney due to the trust-
ing relationship which has matured and the many privileged
communications which have transpired between them.
Given the varying motives which may underlie a defendant's deci-
sion to proceed with incompetent counsel, a trial court must inter-
vene and perform a sufficient inquiry into the defendant's choice to
continue with ineffective counsel as well as the defendant's knowl-
edge and ability to make that decision.2 65 The responsibility of pre-
serving the integrity of the judicial process directly involves the
intervention and possible remedial action of the trial judge.266
262. See Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 457, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968)
(en banc); Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121 (D.C. 1985); Harling v. United States,
387 A.2d 1101 (D.C. 1978).
263. See infra note 265.
264. See Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 457, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968)
(en banc); Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121 (D.C. 1985); Harling v. United States,
387 A.2d 1101 (D.C. 1978).
265. "When it appears in the course of litigation that a lawyer's performance is fall-
ing short, it should be the trial judge's responsibility, as the person responsible for the
manner in which justice is administered in his court, to take appropriate action."
Schwarzer, Dealing With Incompetent Counsel - The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 633, 639 (1980). See also, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)
("[J]udges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys
who are representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts").
266. See supra note 265.
B. The Role of the Judge
Courts have recognized the duty of a trial judge to maintain and
regulate the events that occur during a trial.2 67. This duty to safe-
guard the integrity of a trial necessarily gives a judge the power to
supervise the proceedings at hand.26 8 As stated previously, a defend-
ant's decision to continue through his trial with incompetent counsel
may involve many factors. 26 9 Judges should be more involved and of-
fer assistance when a defendant is confronted with the decision of
whether or not to proceed with incompetent counsel.270 One way in
which a judge could greatly influence a defendant's rational decision
would be to allow the defendant to confer with others before decid-
ing to waive his right to competent counsel.271
1. Appointment of Advisory Counsel
In situations where the defendant is faced with the decision of con-
tinuing with incompetent counsel, the trial judge should appoint co-
counsel or advisory counsel to assist the defendant. This temporary
counsel would discuss the defendant's options with him and advise
him accordingly. This is analogous to the situation a trial judge often
faces in monitoring a Faretta defendant's defense.272 In a Faretta sce-
nario, if the trial judge believes that the defendant is inadequately
representing himself, the judge has the discretion to appoint co-coun-
267. See In re Subpoena Served Upon John Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1985)
(en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1983);
People v. McKenzie, 34 Cal. 3d 616, 626, 668 P.2d 769, 775, 194 Cal. Rptr. 462, 468 (1983)
("Upon the trial judge rests the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with solici-
tude for the essential rights of the accused") (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 71 (1942)).
268. See Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975) (judge's duty to
maintain fair administration of justice imparts power to control proceedings); Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942). Additionally, a judge has the power to impose
disciplinary actions and sanctions upon counsel. See generally ABA STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL
JUDGE, § 1.1(a) (1974) (trial judge may take the initiative to inquire into issues which
affect a proper trial determination).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 251-55.
270. Judicial involvement should, however, be limited. See generally Babcock, Fair
Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 1161, 1170 (1982) (the inquiry should not place counsel's every move under a
judicial microscope, for such actions could "destroyn the adversary system by second-
guessing 'tactical' decisions, and impairing the attorney-client relationship").
Specifically, the judge's role as a neutral figure and the sanctity of the attorney-cli-
ent relationship are potential victims of judicial intervention. Schwarzer, supra note
265, at 637-38. However, as stated earlier, without judicial intervention, an attorney's
incompetence in the trial court may lead to a reversal upon appeal and the destabiliza-
tion of the administration of justice. See supra notes 251 & 257.
271. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (court may order advisory
counsel to assist the defendant). See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1974).
272. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
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sel or standby counsel to assist the defendant, even above the defend-
ant's objections.273 Similarly, in the case of incompetent counsel,
such an appointment may be necessary if the defendant is unable to
adequately assess the dangers of proceeding after disposing with in-
competent counsel.274
Additionally, as brought to the attention of the court in the John-
son 275 case, there may be something wrong with a system that de-
clares counsel incompetent but then allows that same incompetent
counsel to advise the defendant on potential removal.276 Such a
likely scenario may indeed mandate the appointment of advisory
counsel.
The importance of the attorney-client relationship also mandates
appointment of an advisory attorney to counsel the defendant. Many
defendants may be hesitant to relinquish their attorneys because of
an established attorney-client relationship.277 Confidences have been
revealed and motives for actions have passed between the parties.
This undoubtedly will affect a defendant's choice in deciding to con-
tinue with counsel which may be incompetent. The valuable role
that advisory counsel could play in informing and explaining to the
defendant other available alternatives must be recognized.2 78
Similar measures taken by a trial judge when dealing with incom-
petence would also help to eliminate any mistrust the defendant
might have concerning the judge's finding that his counsel is incom-
petent. If the defendant is instructed by an impartial observing attor-
ney in addition to the remarks of the trial judge, a better informed
decision by the defendant will likely result.
273. Id. See People v. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d 833, 861, 760 P.2d 423, 436-37, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 227, 239-40 (1988) (en banc) (courts are capable of appointing advisory counsel for
pro se defendants in death penalty cases. If a pro se defendant requests advisory coun-
sel, a trial court's refusal of appointment may be an abuse of discretion), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1037) (1989).
274. See Schwarzer, supra note 265, at 652-53.
275. People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 387 N.E.2d 688 (1979).
276. Id. at 188-89, 387 N.E.2d at 691-92.
277. See Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d at 893, 760 P.2d at 458, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 261-62 ("Effec-
tive assistance of counsel also contemplates a relationship of trust and cooperation be-
tween attorney and client, particularly when the attorney is defending the client's
liberty") (citations omitted). But see Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (the sixth
amendment does not provide for a "meaningful relationship between an accused and
his counsels").
278. See supra note 271.
2. A Family Affair
As demonstrated in Johnson, the court should also allow the de-
fendant to discuss possible counsel alternatives with his family, if
readily available. 279 Similar to the effect of appointing advisory coun-
sel, additional input from the family will likely result in a sound de-
cision as well as less mistrust on the part of the defendant. 280
In People v. Escarcega,28 the need for appointed advisory counsel
and discussions with family were evident. In his appeal, Escarcega
claimed that the series of continuances and the extended prolonga-
tion of his trial resulted in "stress induced by months of delay while
he was incarcerated." 28 2 The defendant maintained that the system
had failed him, urging that he was forced to hire and continue with a
low-priced, inexperienced attorney to rid himself of the long delays
caused by the overworked court-appointed attorney. The court found
that Escarcega's case had not been prejudiced by the lengthy trial de-
lays,28 3 stating the defendant himself did not assert that the delay
had aversely affected his defense. 28 4 However, the court glossed over
the fact that Escarcega did suffer months of delay. Instead, the court
found that the connection between the previous delay of appointed
counsel and the defendant's choice to continue with his retained at-
torney was "so attenuated as to be nonexistent." 285 Although Es-
carcega was advised of the problems that he might encounter with
Sandoval as his attorney, he may have also been genuinely frustrated
with the delays which caused his further incarceration. His first at-
torney, Part, caused him a postponement of almost seven months.
The possibility that Escarcega relied upon the substituted Sandoval
who "promised [him] the moon" clearly exists.2 0 The prolongation
of his trial and frustration with Part could have affected Escarcega's
frame of mind, causing him to adopt a "just get it over with" state of
mind.287 Thus, with the increasingly crowded court dockets and
overworked public defenders,28 8 a long trial delay which involves a
waiver of competent or effective counsel should be carefully ex-
amined for signs that the defendant may genuinely be frustrated
with the justice system. Such frustration may not adequately be ex-
279. People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 185, 387 N.E.2d 688, 690 (1979).
280. Id,
281. 186 Cal. App. 3d 377, 230 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1986).
282. Escarcega, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 388, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
283. Id
284. IM at 387, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
285. I&
286. Id. at 388, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
287. Escarcega experienced over 11 trial delays during his seven-month wait. Id. at
383-84, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
288. The problems associated with overburdened court systems continue to affect a
defendant's right to a fair and competent trial. See generally Klein, supra note 227.
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posed by questioning on the record. A thorough investigation, involv-
ing appointment of advisory counsel, might be necessary to protect
the defendant's right to a fair trial, especially when the system may
be directly contributing to his choice of actions.
Although it can be argued that this procedure could invariably
cause delays and tax an already overburdened public defender sys-
tem, it would promote judicial efficiency in the long run. First, an
automatic assignment of advisory counsel would help to ensure that
the court makes a sufficient inquiry into the defendant's choice and
ability to waive his sixth amendment right to effective counsel. A
trial record which evidences the appointment of advisory counsel to
assist the defendant with the resolution of this predilection would
more likely satisfy the "adequately reflected in the record" waiver
requirement if an express waiver were not given by the defendant.
Second, trial court decisions would be less prone to reversal or re-
mand if the defendant is well-informed and advised before delivering
a waiver of his rights.289 This would in turn promote the finality of
judgments; a judicial goal of efficiency. Trial court decisions would
be less prone to attack from claims of incompetent counsel upon ap-
peal.2 90 In addition, if the guiding purpose behind court procedures-is
truly the protection of a defendant's constitutional' rights, an ade-
quately informed defendant will ensure that the adversarial system is
not biased in favor of one side or the other.,
3. Other Measures
In the case of an attorney who is grossly incompetent, appointment
of advisory counsel may be an inadequate measure. If the attorney's
incompetence is directly jeopardizing the trial proceedings and seri-
ously interferes with the administration of justice, a judge may war-
rant the attorney's removal by ordering a substitution of counsel.29 1
This contingency would arise in a situation where the interest of the
defendant in counsel of choice is greatly outweighed by the need of
the court to further the interests of justice.292
289. See People v. Escarcega, 186 Cal. App. 3d 377, 399, 230 Cal. Rptr. 638, 648
(1986).
290. One of the prosecutor's worst nightmares is the need to watch opposing coun-
sel's every action to protect against the possibility of reversal for reasons of incompe-
tence. Babcock, supra note 270, at 1170.
291. See supra note 110. However, the trial judge should initially question the at-
torney during a sidebar conference or privately in his chambers.. Schwarzer, supra
note 265, at 662.
292. Schwarzer, supra note 265, at 662.
This standard has also been utilized by courts in previous holdings
concerning the right to waive conflict-free counsel.293 However, re-
cent decisions have demonstrated the increasing reluctance of courts
to recognize a defendant's right to waive conflict-free counsel.294
This right is somewhat analogous to the defendant's right to waive
competent counsel in that the defendant is asserting his right to
counsel of choice, even though that choice may be viewed by the
court as against his best interests. The recent judicial determinations
concerning a defendant's right to waive conflict-free cou sel should
not similarly hinder the defendant's right to waive competent coun-
sel, but rather, should serve to encourage courts to diligently evalu-
ate the defendant's right to counsel of choice.295
V. WAIVING THE RIGHT TO COMPETENT COUNSEL:
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
A. Waiving Conflict-Free Counsel: Is There An Analogy?
The sixth amendment's right to counsel provision guarantees a
right to conflict-free counsel. 296 Courts which have dealt with the is-
sue of waiving the right to competent counsel have analogized this
right to the right to waive conflict-free representation.297 The right
to waive conflict-free counsel was firmly imbedded in caselaw until
the 1988 United States Supreme Court decision in Wheat v. United
States.298 In Wheat, the Court examined the issue arising when a de-
fendant requests to continue with new counsel of his choice, although
that new counsel is burdened by a conflict of interest.299
B. Wheat: The Facts
Petitioner Mark Wheat and two others were charged with conspir-
acy in possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. Attorney
Eugene Iredale represented the two codefendants, Juvena Gomez-
Barajas and Javier Bravo. Gomez-Barajas was exonerated on the
293. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162 (1988); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335 (1980) (court has duty to avoid a conflict of interest between defendant and
counsel); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978) (court should be apprised of
the risk and appoint counsel if conflict is too great).
294. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164.
295. As the California Supreme Court stated more than two decades ago, "We do
not demand prescience of trial cofirts faced with decisions involving the right of repre-
sentation by counsel - but we must require of them a resourceful diligence directed
toward the protection of that right to the fullest extent consistent with effective judi-
cial administration." People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d 199, 209, 417 P.2d 868, 875, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 284, 291 (1966).
296. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
297. See People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 185-86, 387 N.E.2d 688, 690 (1979).
298. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
299. Id at 161-64.
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drug charges and intended to enter guilty pleas on remaining allega-
tions. Bravo pled guilty on one drug charge. Wheat then requested
that Iredale be substituted as his counsel or, in the alternative, ap-
pointed as co-counsel at his trial. The district court denied the
request.300
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court,
noting the judge's obligation to balance the defendant's right to coun-
sel of choice with the right to conflict-free representation.301 The ap-
peals court observed that the district judge's decision must be
respected in an attempt to avoid the scenario where "denial of either
of these would result in ... reversible error." 30 2
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of five on the
Supreme Court, agreed. He rejected the defendant's position that the
right to conflict-free counsel should be allowed to be waived.303 The
Court stated that there is a presumption of allowing the defendant's
choice of counsel, but depending on the specific facts, this may be
outweighed by the vigil of conflict.304 The function of the right to
counsel was defined "simply to ensure that criminal defendants re-
ceive a fair trial."305 The defendant's right to counsel of choice was
not emphasized. As illustrations, the Court recounted that the de-
fendant has no right to appointment of any attorney he wishes, no
right to representation by a non-attorney, and no right to be repre-
sented by counsel with ties to the opposing side.306
C. Separating the Wheat from the Chaff
The Court's decision in Wheat demonstrated instances where the
results of and the situations surrounding waiver of conflict-free coun-
sel are analogous to waiver of competent counsel. First, the Court
identified the role of the court system as the guardian of fair trials
and ethical legal standards. The Court also noted the lower courts'
desire for finality in decisions, stating that courts have a "legitimate
wish ... that their judgments remain intact on appeal." 307 The ma-
jority believed that this interest would be undermined if defendants,
300. United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 153
(1988).
301. Id. at 1402.
302. Id.
303. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988).
304. Id.
305. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
306. Id. at 159.
307. Id.
after waiving the right to conflict-free counsel at trial, were allowed
to appeal their ineffective assistance of counsel claims.3 08
The majority also found that there were too many unknown vari-
ables involved in permitting potential conflict of counsel problems to
develop. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "the likelihood and
dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to
predict, ven for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials."30 9
The Court further stated that a "[d]istrict [c]ourt must be allowed
substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest
.... "310 Thus, the Court noted that another court under similar cir-
cumstances could reasonably reach a different result.311
What impact will this decision have regarding a defendant's right
to waive competent counsel? This comment suggests that the major-
ity's position on waivers of conflict-free representation in Wheat is
readily distinguishable from that of a knowing and voluntary waiver
of competent counsel.
First, a waiver of competent counsel by definition does not involve
a conflict of interest between the attorney and the defendant. The
attorney in the former case is visibly acting in the sole interests of his
client, and cannot be said to hold disparate interests to those of the
accused. However, in a conflict of interest case, the attorney may be
acting for other parties, for his own interests, or for the interests of
third parties with a stake in the outcome. The United States
Supreme Court's holding in Wheat deals specifically with a conflict
of interest situation between counsel and the defendant. If an attor-
ney did possess interests which were discordant or incompatible with
those of the defendant, and the attorney was also incompetent, a con-
flict of interest situation would be established, and the Court's posi-
tion would then be applicable. However, if the attorney is "only"
incompetent and lacks a conflict of interest, the Court's fact-specific
ruling would not apply.
Furthermore, the situation of waiving competent counsel differs
from that of waiving conflict-free counsel in that a judge has a pro-
nounced ability to foresee the results and potential difficulties which
a competency waiver may pose later in the trial. In United States v.
Dolan,312 the Third Circuit Court rationalized that a judge facing a
possible conflict of interest "may find that the waiver cannot be intel-
ligently made simply because he is not in a position to inform the de-
fendant of the foreseeable prejudices multiple representation might
308. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 161-62 (1986).
309. Id. at 162-63.
310. Id. at 163.
311. Id. at 164.
312. 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978).
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entail for him." 313 The trial judge in a conflict of interest situation is
placed in a position to determine whether the conflict he perceives
"dmay or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial
progresses."314
However, where an attorney is incompetent, the trial judge is not
in a position where he must "wait and see" if counsel's acts will prej..
udice the defendant. The judge who deals with a waiver of compe-
tent counsel does not need to be concerned with the types of
unpredictable ulterior motives under which a defendant's conflict of
interest attorney may be acting. Due to this fact, the judge is better
able to foresee the present and future effects of the waiver. This en-
ables him to more accurately control and gauge the future conduct of
both the attorney and the trial.
In addition, the judge can observe and note firsthand the capabili-
ties of the lawyer by evaluating his demeanor before the court. The
attorney's skill can be judged by the discovery methods, motions, ob-
jections, and arguments put forth in defense. The judge can then an-
alyze exactly how incompetent the attorney is in representing the
defendant's interests. Therefore, this places the judge in a superior
position to advise and counsel the defendant of his options or to aid
with the accused's defense, should that be necessary.
This comment suggests that judges must be given more liberty in
deciding what actions to take with individual defendants. The trial
judge is in a key position to gauge potential problems as they arise.
He is active and in control of the developments, and can take appro-
priate measures as he sees fit. As the dissent in Wheat emphasized, a
trial judge will have "greater familiarity with such factors as the abil-
ity of the defendant knowingly and voiuntarily to waive potential
conflict ... the character of the lawyers, [and] the particular facts of
the case ... ,15 This familiarity should enable a judge to maintain
his ability to further the interests of justice.
Furthermore, the court may exercise many judicial options to pro-
tect the proceedings, such as stepping in to disallow the waiver if a
determination is made that such an act would "gravely imperilo the
prospect of a fair trial."'1 6 This would "grant a criminal defendant
effective control over the conduct of his defense,"3 17 while concur-
313. Id at 1181.
314. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988).
315. Id. at 173 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
316. Id at 166 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 165.
rently protecting the function of the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel of choice. As the Court stated in Strickland v. Washington,318
"Government violates the right to effective assistance when it inter-
feres in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent
decisions about how to conduct the defense." 3 19
Finally, the Court's decision in Wheat is consistent with previous
court holdings that allow waivers of effective counsel. The Wheat
holding mandates that a district court must acknowledge a defend-
ant's right to counsel of choice, but allows that right to be overridden
by an existing conflict or a "potential for serious conflict." 320 This
holding harmonizes with decisions that have followed the Smith v.
Superior Court,321 line of cases. The Smith progeny similarly man-
dates a right to choose one's counsel unless there is a severe threat to
the adjudication of a fair trial.322
If the trial court fulfills its duty of relating to the defendant the
hazards and consequences of continuing with ineffective counsel, the
defendant will satisfy the Johnson knowledge requirement based
upon the Faretta waiver. A defendant has never been obligated to
make an accurate appraisal of "each factor that was relevant to his
decision" before waiving his rights.323 Thus, a defendant making a
waiver of effective counsel similarly does not need to contemplate
every potential implication of his waiver. A trial court faced with a
waiver of competent counsel should follow the precedent and reason-
ing set out in the Smith line of cases.
D. A Synopsis: Stearnes v. Clinton
Recently, the holdings suggested by the Smith line of cases were
collated and harmonized against the backdrop of the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in Wheat.324 In Stearnes v. Clinton,3 25 the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that a judge may not arbi-
318. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
319. Id, at 686.
320. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 156 (1988).
321. 68. Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968) (en banc).
322. See Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); see also
Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating "[w]e do not understand the
language in Wheat to mean that the right to counsel of choice is important only inso-
far as it secures the right to effective assistance of counsel.... [T]he amendment also
comprehends other related rights, such as the 'right to select and be represented by
one's preferred attorney' ") (emphasis in original) (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486
U.S. 153, 159 (1988)).
323. Brady v. United States, 397.U.S. 742, 757 (1970). See also Colorado v. Spring,
479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) ("The Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect
know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment
privilege").
324. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
325. 780 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
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trarily remove a defendant's counsel for potential incompetence. 326
Rather, a judge may only remove a defendant's counsel when there is
an unreasonable interference with the administration of justice.327
. In Stearnes, the defendant was charged with murder. The trial
judge appointed an attorney, Carlton McLarty, to represent the de-
fendant. A key witness against Stearnes, Anita Hanson, had previ-
ously been allowed to stay at the residence of the assistant district
attorney, Marta Rosas. McLarty wished to interview Hanson as part
of his preparation for trial, and attempted to do so through compli-
ance with the state's rules regarding the interviewing of witnesses.
His requests for an interview were ignored.328
Some time later, Hanson contacted McLarty herself, agreeing to
talk with him. McLarty suggested he meet her with one of his col-
leagues at her apartment. Hanson, her roommate, McLarty, and an
attorney from McLarty's office were all present at the meeting. Af-
ter McLarty questioned Hanson for a period of time, Hanson tele-
phoned Rosas to inform her the interview was in progress. Rosas
summoned the police, and ended the interview.329
Because he had not completed the interview, McLarty motioned to
depose Hanson for further questioning. At the trial hearing on the
motion, the district attorney, in addition to opposing McLarty's mo-
tion, also motioned the court to have McLarty removed. The trial
judge ignored McLarty's motion, and instead ruled to remove Mc-
Larty as Stearnes' counsel. The judge stated that he was "concerned"
over McLarty's actions, which he felt could potentially have raised
serious issues involving the tampering of witnesses.33 0 The judge an-
nounced that "since I did appoint you, I am going to rescind that ap-
pointment."3 31 The trial judge then removed McLarty, stating that
McLarty "was not competent to continue on this, and he has so an-
tagonized the District Attorney's Office that he can't get any coopera-
tion from them in any shape, form or fashion." 332 Stearnes then
petitioned for a writ of mandamus to reverse the trial judge's deci-
326. Id. at 225.
327. Id. at 223.
328. Id. at 217.
329. Id. at 217-18.
330. Id. at 218.
331. Id at 219.
332. Id. Interestingly, the judge had informed replacement counsel of his substitu-
tion appointment before the trial hearing occurred. Id. This may imply the judge had
previously made his finding concerning McLarty's incompetence.
sion to remove McLarty as his attorney.33 3
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, sitting en banc, granted
Stearnes' request.3 3 4 The court began its analysis with the holding in
Smith v. Superior Court,3 35 a case the court found to be "remarkably
similar" to Stearnes'.3 3 6 The Stearnes court concurred with the
Smith holding that "a trial court did not have the inherent power to
remove trial counsel because in his subjective opinion counsel was
incompetent."337
Later, in discussing the facts of Harling v. United States,338 the
Stearnes court also agreed that a trial judge, when seeking to replace
counsel, must treat appointed counsel and retained counsel identi-
cally.339 The court stated that "any effort to distinguish between the
two will be premised upon a fallacy because the 'attorney's responsi-
bility is to the person he has undertaken to represent rather than to
the individual or agency which pays for the service.' 340
The appeals court then examined the impact of the Wheat decision
on the present state of law in allowing a trial judge to remove ap-
pointed counsel.3 41 The court stated that although previous holdings
in the area of waiving conflict-free representation might be of "ques-
tionable validity,"342 the Wheat decision still prohibits a trial judge
from acting unreasonably in removing counsel: "[T]he basis of the
opinion is still sound: a defendant has the right to retain counsel of
his choice and establish an attorney-client relationship. It logically
follows . . . that once an attorney is appointed[,] the same attorney-
client relationship is established and it should be protected."3 43
In further' support against arbitrary removal of counsel, the court
cited Wheat directly: "The District Court must recognize a presump-
tion in favor of petitioner's counsel of choice, but that presumption
may be overcome. . . ."344 The court then concluded: "The Supreme
Court has held, consistent with Smith .... [and] Harling . . . that a
presumption exists that a defendant is entitled to counsel of his
choice and a trial court cannot infringe upon one's constitutional
right to counsel unless there is an actual or serious potential for con-
333. Id
334. Id
335. 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968) (en banc).
336. Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc).
337. IM
338. 387 A.2d 1101 (D.C. 1978).
339. Stearnes, 780 S.W.2d at 221-22.
340. Id at 222 (quoting Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 561-62, 440 P.2d 65,
74, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10 (1968) (en banc)).
341. Id. at 223.
342. Id. at 222.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 223 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988)).
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flict."345 Therefore, because a trial judge must give deference to the
defendant's right to counsel of choice, a "serious" showing will be re-
quired before counsel may be removed.346
VI. CONCLUSION
The judicial protection afforded a criminal defendant under the
Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a qualified right to counsel
of choice. Flowing from this constitutional prerogative is the novel
right of a defendant to waive competent counsel. Although this right
arguably conflicts with the judiciary's duty to provide effective repre-
sentation to the defendant, the defendant's right to present his own
personal defense must be respected.
The right to waive competent counsel may be used by a defendant
as a weapon by which to attack and appeal a conviction on grounds of
ineffectiveness of counsel, or it may be used to potentially interfere
with the course of proceedings during a trial. However, the waiver
may also be legitimately claimed to protect an established attorney-
client relationship. Whichever motive the defendant may possess in
making a competence waiver, the trial court is forced to consider and
balance the underlying motives.
On one hand, as protector of the defendant's right to a fair trial,
the court must ensure that justice is administered orderly and effi-
ciently. This analysis requires the trial court to mandate that a de-
fendant's waiver meet the Faretta standard: knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily made, and adequately reflected on the court rec-
ord.347 When used properly, the established waiver standard ensures
that the defendant will receive a fair trial, and that the resulting
judgment will be protected from later claims of ineffective counsel
from the defendant, thus promoting finality.
Likewise, as protector of the trial proceedings, the court must also
ensure that the defendant has the right to counsel of choice. The
trial judge, in recognizing this qualified constitutional prerogative,
may appoint advisory counsel to assist the defendant with his deci-
sion in weighing his available alternatives. This analysis requires
that the trial judge give deference to the defendant's right to waive
competent counsel and the established attorney-client privilege un-
less the result seriously jeopardizes the interests of justice. Gener-
345. Id
346. Id.
347. See supra notes 65-91 and accompanying text.
ally, the court should interfere with a defendant's choice to continue
with incompetent counsel only in situations of gross incompetence.
Very few cases have addressed a defendant's right to waive compe-
tent counsel. When faced with this issue, the courts will continue
their struggle to balance a duty both to the defendant and to the
criminal justice system. Additionally, as the surge of narcotics-re-
lated cases overcrowd our court dockets, the depersonalization of
these and other routine trials will occur and the attention paid to in-
dividual defendants and their counsel may diminish. The appeals
court for Nightstalker Richard Ramirez may be confronted with a
waiver of competent counsel from the trial court.348 If Ramirez
made an effective waiver of competent counsel before the trial judge,
his claim of incompetent counsel will be meaningless. However, if
the trial court did not receive an effective waiver, it may have left
itself open to an attack and possible reversal. Richard Ramirez may
have yet another day in court.
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